Florida Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 5

Article 3

December 2003

Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework
and Vision for Public Health
James F. Chldress
Ruth Gaare Berhnheim

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James F. Chldress and Ruth Gaare Berhnheim, Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A
Framework and Vision for Public Health, 55 Fla. L. Rev. (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Chldress and Berhnheim: Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vis

BEYOND THE LIBERAL AND COMMUNITARIAN IMPASSE: A
FRAMEWORK AND VISION FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
James F. Childress*
Ruth GaareBernheim°"
I.
II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION

...................................

LIBERAL VERSUS COMMUNITARIAN POLITICAL

PHILOSOPHIES ....................................

1193

CONFLICTS AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH
AND LIBERTY ......................................

1195

FRAMEWORK FOR DELIBERATION: BALANCING VERSUS
REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS ..........................

1197

A. Principlesor Processes ..........................
B. Resolving Dilemmas .............................
C. Absolutist, Presumptivist,and Contextualist
Approaches ...................................
V.

JUSTIFYING LIBERTY-LIMITING PUBLIC HEALTH
MEASURES ........................................

A. JustificatoryConditions ..........................
1. Effectiveness.. . .............................
2. N ecessity ...................................
3. Least Restrictive or Intrusive Means .............
4. Proportionality ..............................
5. Im partiality .................................
6. Public Justification ...........................
B. Concerns aboutJustificatoryConditions and the
Relevance of Voluntariness .......................
C. Imposing Community and Expressing Community .....
VI.

1191

JUSTIFICATION IN CONTEXT ..........................

A. Relationships in Public Health ....................

1198
1199
1200
1202
1202
1202
1203
1203
1204
1204
1205
1206
1208
1209
1210

* John Allen Hollingsworth Professor of Ethics; Director, Institute for Practical Ethics and
Public Life, University of Virginia.
** Executive Director, Institute for Practical Ethics and Public Life; Academic Director of
the MPH Program, Department of Health Evaluation Sciences, School of Medicine, University of
Virginia.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 55

1213
B. Civic Identity andPublic Deliberation ..............
1215
C. Imaginative Engagement .........................
D. Implicationsfor Risk Analysis andManagement ....... 1216
VII.

1218

CONCLUSIONS ....................................
I. INTRODUCTION

How can our society respect liberty and privacy, among other values,
and, at-the same time, protect public health and security? Our aim in this
Commentary is to offer a deliberative framework that transcends the
impasse created by overly simplistic liberal and communitarian
perspectives. This framework is designed to provide a rigorous and
imaginative way to address both individual liberty and privacy, on the one
hand, and public health and security, on the other. It shares the spirit that
motivates, and much of the vision that inspires, Professor Lawrence
Gostin's valuable description, analysis, and prescription. But it also seeks
to avoid some problems that plague his approach.'
Our Commentary is an exercise in applied or practical political
philosophy. Political philosophy, whether formal (e.g., a full-blown
theory) or informal (e.g., a politically-embedded framework), provides an
important foundation for and sets limits on public health law. It identifies
the normative values that should structure the relationship between the
state and the individual, the legal powers that enable officials, within
defensible limits, to address public health threats, and the processes of
reflection, deliberation, and justification that should direct the exercise of
the legal powers. As a normative enterprise, political philosophy shares
much with both moral philosophy and social philosophy even when they
address ostensibly distinct spheres of life. For instance, wherever the line
is drawn between political philosophy and moral philosophy, fundamental
ethical values define the appropriate relationship between the individual
and the state in public health law and elsewhere. And wherever the line is

1. Even though our response concentrates on Gostin's article in this issue, Lawrence 0.
Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Farare Limitations on Personaland Economic
Liberties Justified?,55 FLA. L. REV. 1105 (2003) [hereinafter Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens
Health], we also draw on some of his other writings. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health
Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFF.
79 (2002) [hereinafter Gostin, Rethinking IndividualRights]. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (2000) (providing an important backdrop for this
discussion).
2. Our conception of informal political philosophy is close to what Michael Sandel calls
"public philosophy," by which he means "the political theory implicit in our practice, the
assumptions about citizenship and freedom that inform our public life." MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DIsCONTENT: AMERICA INSEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4
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drawn between political philosophy and social philosophy, numerous
social institutions, in addition to the state, play significant roles in public
health. Indeed, much of the debate about public health concerns when
government may justifiably coerce individuals-for instance, in mandatory
quarantine-and justifiably intervene in economic institutions-for
example, by confiscating property.
The immediate practical context for reflection about public health law
has changed because of the threats of bioterrorism (after the terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon and the anthrax attacks
in 2001) and of contagious diseases (after a decade of increasing concern,
which was further intensified by the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003). The felt need for biopreparedness against
both types of threat creates a sense of urgency in debates about whether,
to what extent, and how public health laws need to change.
Biopreparedness provides a test case for proposed revisions in public
health laws and for different political philosophies.
Even though we will refer, in passing, to current debates about the
Model State Emergency Health Preparedness Act (MSEHPA),3 we will
concentrate on political philosophy, broadly understood. However,
political philosophy is not a timeless enterprise, abstracted from historical
contexts, particular types of society, and structures of political life. Indeed,
debates about the appropriate relationships between the government and
individuals do and should reflect those realities and practical concerns
about the adequacy of public health law in light of new threats to public
health.
II. LIBERAL VERSUS COMMUNITARIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES

Two major perspectives dominate Gostin's discussion of political
philosophy: liberalism and communitarianism. Liberalism receives more
attention, in part because Gostin believes it is necessary to overcome many
of its limits and deficiencies. He distinguishes libertarian and egalitarian
versions of liberalism. However, in his analysis, egalitarianism receives
little attention, mainly in passing and then primarily in relation to fair
allocation of resources. As a result, libertarianism, which he views as
"hard" liberalism, tends to represent liberalism in his analysis. Whether
civil or economic in nature, libertarianism becomes the primary opponent
of communitarianism. In short, even though Gostin recognizes different
versions of liberalism, he mainly analyzes and attacks libertarianism. As

3. CTR. FOR LAW AND THE PUBuC'S HEALTH, GEORGETOWN UNIV. & JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIV., THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Dec. 21, 2001), at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
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a result, he fails to examine adequately whether some versions of
liberalism could accommodate his legitimate concerns.
Communitarianism is a catch-all label for a wide range of positions,
and Gostin does not analyze it as fully as he does liberalism, at least in its
libertarian form. Indeed, communitarianism functions more as a
perspective from which to view problems than as a fully-developed theory.
However, Amitai Etzioni, a self-proclaimed communitarian, contends that
Gostin's current approach to public health "builds on new (or responsive)
communitarian thinking," even if not explicitly indicated, as the
"framework" for public health.'
Not only is Gostin's communitarianism underdeveloped, but, at least
in its current form, it is problematic in many respects. For instance, in his
discussion of community, Gostin tends to view "collective interests" as
mainly (though not necessarily exclusively) public health and security, and
he often (but not always) sets those "collective interests" against "personal
interests" in matters such as liberty. Even though we will concentrate on
civil liberties in our discussion, both civil and economic liberties belong
among collective interests, rather than being opposed to collective
interests. Hence, it is important to underline society's interest, as a
collectivity, in civil and economic liberties, not only in public health and
security.
For Gostin, community is "characterized by a shared set of social bonds
or a social web," 5 a formulation that captures much that community
involves. The community's "social bonds" are constituted by shared
values, as well as by shared myths and narratives, which often embody
these values. These values can include-and in the case of the U.S. do
include-civil liberties. Civil liberties are constitutive values, as much as
values of public health and security. And, as constitutive values, they both
shape and express our national identity. Gostin recognizes this point when
he indicates that the values of "liberty and freedom, openness and
tolerance.., are part of the national identity."6 However, if civil liberties
are values within our communal identity, within our "social bonds" and
"social web," they represent important "collective interests." Such a
reconceptualization leads to an important shift in perspective: Putative
"trade-offs" (one of Gostin's favorite metaphors) occur not between
individual interests and collective interests, as though only the latter
constitute community, but rather within and among our social values, our
"collective interests."

4. Amitai Etzioni, PublicHealthLaw: A CommunitarianPerspective, 21 HEALTH AFF. 102,
102 (2002).
5. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note 1, at 1155.
6. Id. at 1159.
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Public health is both an intrinsic and an instrumental value for society;
it is a good in itself and for what it enables society to do. The health of the
public is a public good because it is not just the sum of individual health
indices and cannot be attained through individual actions alone. (We will
return later to some conceptual and normative issues in setting the
boundaries and directions of public health.) In society's pursuit of this
good, public policies are assessed in part according to whether they are
effective and efficient means to public health. However, we also evaluate
public health measures by health-independent standards, such as liberty
and privacy, that also are constitutive of our society's identity.
The putative "pitched battle over civil and economic liberties in an era
of bioterrorism"7 and thus over public health law takes place, in Gostin's
perspective, between liberals and communitarians-hence, the overall title
for this part of our paper: "Liberal versus Communitarian Political
Philosophies." However, it is important to note that the putative
combatants are fighting over limited, though not insignificant, terrain.
Indeed, for the most part, Gostin stresses that the liberal and
communitarian perspectives actually converge. In his analysis, these
perspectives accept the exercise of state power in cases of significant risk
and reject it where there is no "discernible risk."8 In fact, they "diverge"
only in cases that fall in-between--cases of "enhanced risk"--where
liberals would be inclined to reject state power and communitarians would
be inclined to accept it.9 Gostin's framework for "balancing" would
require "hard trade-offs" between public health or security, on the one
hand, and civil and economic liberties, on the other. Proponents of the
primacy of each would lose something in these "trade-offs."
III. CONFLICTS AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN PUBLIC
HEALTH AND LIBERTY

There is vigorous debate about conflicts and trade-offs between public
health and liberty. While Gostin views these conflicts and trade-offs as
common and even inevitable, George Annas, a lawyer and bioethicist at
Boston University, views them as rare and unnecessary.' On the one side,
for Gostin, the harmony between liberty and public health/security is

7. Id. at 1108.
8. Id. at 1109.

9. Id. In the last part of this Commentary, we will raise serious questions about Gostin's
analysis of risk, particularly his interpretation of risk assessment in terms that appear to make it
almost exclusively "scientific."
10. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Bioterrorism, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 337 (2002) [hereinafter Annas, Civil Liberties]; George J. Annas, Bioterrorism,
Public Health, andHuman Rights, 21 HEALTH AFF. 94 (2002) [hereinafter Annas, Human Rights].
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contingent--"more often than not they collide."" On the other side, Annas
contends that "human rights and health are not inherently conflicting goals
that must be traded off against each other."' 2 He thus rejects the idea that
"in a public health emergency, there must be a trade-off between effective
public health measures and civil rights."' 3 Despite its rhetorical fervor, this
debate is largely misplaced; it results mainly from incomplete or
unnuanced statements on both sides.
One historical observation can set the background. The conflict
between liberty and public health was common and even accentuated in
public health law until the last half of the twentieth century when several
major changes occurred. First came the institutionalization of rights of
liberty, privacy, and due process, both generally and specifically in laws
related to health care, for example, in decisions about contraception,
abortion, life-sustaining treatment, and treatment of persons with mental
illness. Second, the major threats from contagious diseases appeared to be
under control. Third, when AIDS appeared, both the mode of transmission
of HIV infection and the structure of civil liberties combined to create
what has been called "AIDS exceptionalism": AIDS was generally
exempted from some of the traditional public health measures, including
quarantine.' 4 Indeed, assertions of the harmony between rights and public
health increased and intensified, and Gostin helped to craft this model of
harmony. 5 As Ronald Bayer and James Colgrove, both of the Center for
the History and Ethics of Public Health at Columbia University, note:
Given the unique biological, epidemiological, and political
factors that shaped the public policy discussion, it became
possible to assert that there was no tension between public
health and civil liberties, that policies that protected the latter
would foster the former, and that policies that intruded on
rights would subvert the public health.' 6
As a result, there was general rethinking and reorientation of public health.

11. Gostin, When TerrorismThreatens Health,supra note 1,at 1108. Elsewhere Gostin offers
a more qualified and nuanced statement: "although public health and civil liberties may be mutually
enhancing in many instances, they sometimes come into conflict." Gostin, Rethinking Individual
Rights, supra 1, at 88.
12. Annas, Human Rights, supra note 10, at 96.
13. Annas, Civil Liberties, supranote 10, at 1340.
14. Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV
Exceptionalism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501-02 (1991).
15. See generally Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Bioterrorism,Public Health, and the
Law, 21 HEALTH AFF. 98 (2002).
16. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss5/3

6

Chldress and Berhnheim: Beyond the Liberal and Communitarian Impasse: A Framework and Vis
DUNWODYCOMMENTARY

1197

Generally, conflicts do not emerge. Effective public health measures
and civil rights can not only co-exist, but civil rights can contribute to
17
public health. Similar points can be made about human rights.
Furthermore, it is often possible to find-and we will argue imperative to
seek-effective public health measures that do not infringe civil rights. So,
anyone who claims "there must be a trade-off' is mistaken if that claim
denies the possibility of coherence. However, if Annas means to assert, as
his language sometimes suggests, that implementing "effective public
health measures" will never conflict with "civil rights" or that "civil
rights" will never be an impediment to "effective public health measures,"
those assertions are implausible.
One of Gostin's extreme formulations is also implausible: "Although
security and liberty sometimes are harmonious, more often than not they
collide."' 8 He must suppose that this claim is obvious because he offers no
support for it; but even the nature of the claim is unclear. On the one hand,
it could be an empirical claim, in which case evidence would be needed
about real-life practices. On the other hand, it could be a conceptualnormative claim that conceptually or normatively collision is unavoidable.
Neither claim is satisfactory. Gostin provides no evidence for the first, and
the second is conceptually and normatively problematic.
Let's suppose, for instance, that a society can rationally persuade
individuals or provide them with adequate incentives to choose voluntarily
to exercise their liberty in certain ways that are consistent with public
security. In such a case, security and liberty would be harmonious, and the
harmony would have been purchased by rational persuasion or incentives,
not by a coercive infringement of liberty. Not only is it difficult to
interpret this situation as a collision that requires a trade-off between
liberty and security, but it can even provide a model for how liberty can be
consistent with public health as well as with public security.
IV. FRAMEWORK FOR DELIBERATION: BALANCING VERSUS
REBUTTING PRESUMPTIONS

Because he believes we face a "dilemma," Gostin seeks a framework
for "balancing" liberty and public health/security. Elsewhere he stresses
that "[t]he balance between individual interests and common goods needs
to be recalibrated in an age of terrorism."' 9 The metaphor of balance
dominates his article, but it appears in several different guises. The balance

17. See generally Jonathan M. Mann, Medicine and Public Health, Ethics, and Human
Rights, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1997, at 6.
18. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note I, at 1107-08. See supra note II
for Gostin's more careful statement.
19. Gostin, Rethinking Individual Rights, supra note 1, at 81.
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or balancing may be mechanical (recalibration of the balance), aesthetic
("appropriate balance"), economic (a "trade-off"), or pragmatic
("successful balancing"). And this process of balancing, which seeks "a
careful balance,"2 occurs within and is structured by another metaphor:
that of "framework."
A. Principles or Processes
A tension may exist between two different conceptions of a framework
for balancing: such a framework may be "principled" or it may focus more
on "process." Using different language, we might characterize these two
conceptions as normative and procedural. Gostin's conception of a
framework includes both principled analysis and process. In some places,
he identifies his goal as to find "a principled framework for balancing
individual and collective interests,"'" or, stated differently, to find "a
principledbasisfor liberty-limiting public health interventions."22 Clearly
in these passages Gostin emphasizes an intellectual framework that can
structure deliberation about "hard trade-offs." In other places, however, his
conception of a "framework" focuses more on processes: "Society's
preferred values will become transparent in the political process."23
Furthermore, his sketch of the "Elements of the Framework" includes "the
democratic process, checks and balances, clear criteria for decisionmaking,
and judicial procedures designed to control the abuse of power by
governmental agencies."24 Nevertheless, Gostin apparently does not
intend to reduce his framework to political processes; among these several
elements, "clear criteria for decisionmaking" represents principled
analysis.25 Finally, Gostin leaves undeveloped and unclear the exact
relationship between the two conceptions of balancing: Is balancing
primarily a matter of principled reasoning or of political processes? If
both, exactly how are the two related?
More attention to "principled" balancing is necessary in part because
Gostin holds that no a priorireason exists for selecting one balance over
another, for preferring either liberty or public health, at least in an
intermediate situation of moderate risk. He contends that it is time to
consider, or reconsider, the balance between these values because of the
level of risk to public health and security that the United States now
confronts. Hence, it is incumbent on him to follow through with his

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health,supra note 1, at 1159.
Id.at 1108 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1160.
Id.at 1161.
Id.at 1165.
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"principled" analysis since he insists that his framework will provide such
an analysis.26
B. Resolving Dilemmas
According to Gostin, we face a "dilemma" because two important
values, liberty and public health, come into conflict and require attention."
His framework attempts to take both values "seriously" and to resolve the
dilemma by balancing them because we lack an aprioriway to adjudicate
the conflict. However, the framework he proposes provides less structure
than he supposes and leaves too much room for subjectivity, even if it is
expressed through democratic mechanisms. For these and other reasons,
we need a more adequate principled (and also process-oriented)
framework for addressing these social values if in fact they conflict.
In a dilemma, real or apparent, two dimensions of values require
attention. One is their range or scope, the other their weight or strength.
Reasoning through value conflicts requires attention to both dimensions,
but Gostin directly addresses only the dimension of weight or strength. He
tends to neglect the dimension of range or scope, even though it may be
implicit at points. In a conflict of values, it may be possible to specify one
value, by restricting its range or scope, so that it does not conflict with the
other.2" For instance, if the range or scope of the value or principle of
liberty could be restricted, then it might not directly conflict with some
public health measures. It may be useful to specify liberties, rather than
considering liberty in an unspecified way, -and this may avert some
potential conflicts or, at a minimum, indicate more precisely the "tradeoffs" involved. Not all liberties are the same. Philosopher Ronald Dworkin
distinguishes "liberty as license," an indiscriminate concept, from "liberty
as independence," a more discriminate concept that reflects a person's
status as independent and equal.29 Laws against violence, and perhaps
against creating substantial risks to the public's health, would violate
liberty as license but not liberty as independence.30 By contrast,
paternalistic laws violate liberty as independence and thus are insulting

26. The closest Gostin comes to providing the promised framework is in his analysis of risk,
which we will examine and critique later in this Commentary.
27. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health, supra note I, at 1108.
28. For a major proposal of specification as a way to address moral problems, see Henry S.
Richardson, Specifying, Balancing,and InterpretingBioethical Principles,25 J.MED. & PHIL. 285
(2000); Henry S. Richardson, Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve ConcreteEthical Problems,
19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 279 (1990).
29. RONALD DwORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SEIOUSLY 262-63 (1977).
30. Id. at 263.
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and demeaning.3 However, even if such specification is helpful-and we
believe it often is-it will not eliminate all potential and actual conflicts.
Hence, it is justifiable to devote primary (though not exclusive)
attention to the weight or strength of different values that may conflict. As
Gostin notes: "The dilemma requires understanding the strength of each
set of interests, recognizing the critical choices, and making the trade-offs
knowingly in advance of a public health emergency."32
C. Absolutist, Presumptivist,and ContextualistApproaches
There are at least three possible ways to interpret the weight or strength
of values: absolutist, presumptivist, or contextualist. Even though these
terms are not wholly precise or fully satisfactory, they highlight the main
features of these different interpretations." An absolutistinterpretation of
the stringency of a particular value asserts its dominance against all or
some competitors. Hence, a value could be absolute (1) against all other
values or (2) only against certain values. The first version of absolutism is
highly implausible because it is easy to imagine a scenario in which we
would believe, quite justifiably, that the value in question, e.g. liberty,
should yield to some other value, which trumps it in that case. The second
version of absolutism holds that the value in question defeats certain, but
not all, values; this version often proposes a lexical or ranked order of
values. Even if initially plausible-and certainly more plausible than the
first version-this second version also runs aground on counterexamples.
Either of these two versions of absolutism would be subject to Gostin's
legitimate attack against a priori views about the relationship of liberty
and public health. An a prioriframework that provides a rank ordering of
values is unable to address real-world complexities, whether the
framework asserts "never trade off liberty for public health" or "public
health always trumps liberty." It fails whether it is extreme libertarian or
extreme communitarian. But if it fails, we are left with two alternative
ways to interpret the weight or strength of liberty and public health:
contextualist and presumptivist. While Gostin defends the former, we
argue that the latter is more defensible and illuminating.
The contextualist approach, which occupies the other end of the
spectrum from the absolutist framework, assigns no weights in advance to
values but simply balances all of them in the context. The context
determines which of these equal values should be emphasized. The
problem is that the "balancing" metaphor leaves decision-making more

31. Id.
32. Gostin, When Terrorism ThreatensHealth, supra note 1, at 1108 (emphasis added).
33. For a related set of categories, see James F. Childress, Principlism,in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ETHICS 1377, 1378-79 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., Routledge 2001).
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intuitive than it needs to be. Even though Gostin's goal is to develop a
structure of reasoning, the principled part of his framework relies on his
analysis of different types of risk (to which we will return later) and on the
"convergence" between communitarian and liberal (libertarian)
perspectives for two of those types of situation of risk: one where public
health wins at the expense of liberty and the other where liberty (as well
as equality) wins but at no loss to public health. Because the community
often triumphs in any real conflict between the individual and the
community, we may need to put more initial weight on the liberty end of
the scale, at least to the extent of putting the burden of proof on those who
would argue for infringing liberty; that is what our moral-social-political
tradition often does, at least within certain settings. And a purely
contextualist approach fails to capture this important presumption.
Apresumptivist framework avoids the problems of both absolutist and
purely contextualist approaches. 4 Because our framework is emphatically
non-absolutist--either liberty or public health can take priority in some
cases-it is closer to a contextualist approach but departs from it in two
significant ways. First, without accepting an a priori or final rank order,
it admits starting points, initial tentative weights, burdens of proof, or
heuristics-there are several different ways to state the tentative priority
of liberty over coercion in public health measures. These presumptions
emerge from a society's core values, as expressed and embodied in its
constitution, laws, policies, and practices, as well as its myths and stories.
Gostin recognizes the central place of liberty in America's de facto
political philosophy: "American society prizes liberty and freedom,
openness and tolerance; these values are part of the national
identity . . . ."" However, in his zeal to keep them from becoming
"inviolable tenets" that cannot be "balanced against equally valid values
of population health and safety,"36 he fails to understand them as

34. Richard Gaskins examines the role of presumptions and burdens of proof:
The legal term burden of proof captures this loosely connected set of reasoning
strategies, which seem to turn up in nearly every field of inquiry. Their common
thread is the need to structure vast areas of indeterminancy-in plainer language,
ignorance-that confronts organized inquiry, not only in practical endeavors like
law, but in scientific investigation, moral reasoning, and philosophical thinking.
In response to social crises, procedures modeled on judicial practice intrude into
the domains of traditional authority (reborn in the adversarial discipline of applied
ethics) and scientific method.
RICHARD H.GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF INMODERN DISCORSE 20 (1992).
35. Gostin, When Terrorism ThreatensHealth, supra note I, at 1159.
36. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAWREIEVl

[Vol. 55

presumptions that do and should structure the selection of public health
means or measures in a non-absolute and rebuttable manner.
Second, and closely connected to the first point, our framework relies
on more than metaphorical balancing. It provides what Gostin's
framework seeks but largely fails to deliver (other than in the analysis of
risk): a structured, indeed, principled process of reasoning and
deliberation. It could be called a framework of presumption/rebuttal,
influenced by both rhetoric and legal reasoning; it could also be called
constrained or restricted balancing, because the process of balancing
occurs within certain constraints or restrictions and, as we will emphasize
later, within the context of a set of relationships."'
V. JUSTIFYING LIBERTY-LIMITING PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES

A. JustificatoryConditions
If there is a presumption in our defacto political philosophy in favor
of liberty or privacy in the selection of public health measures, then our
moral discourse about laws, policies, practices, and particular decisions
should start with these presumptions. However, presumptions can be
rebutted, and it also is important to identify rebuttal conditions-what we
will call justificatory conditions-that indicate when the presumption can
be rebutted, i.e., where coercive measures are justified.38 We will illustrate
these justificatory conditions by reference to one liberty-limiting
intervention: forcible quarantine. Even Annas concedes that "[of] course
there are extreme circumstances under which isolation or quarantine can
be employed."39
1. Effectiveness
Will infringing liberty probably protect public health? If there is no
evidence that a quarantine, for example, would be an effective public
health measure, then it would be a mistake to impose the quarantine.
Indeed, forcible quarantine under those circumstances would not only be
unwise, it would also be ethically unjustified. The intervention must have
a reasonable prospect of success. Even though this first question is an
obvious one, its answers may not be clear-cut. Certitude is not required,
only a reasonable probability of effectiveness.

37. For constrained or restricted balancing, see TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 19-20 (5th ed. 2001).
38. For a similar set ofjustificatory conditions, see James F. Childress et al., Public Health
Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J.L., MED. & ETHIcS 170, 173 (2002).
39. Annas, Human Rights, supra note 10, at 96.
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2. Necessity
In some situations, forcible quarantine could be effective but
unnecessary. In some-perhaps most-situations, we may be able to
secure voluntary compliance without force or the threat of force. Part of
the logic of presumptive values-such as respecting liberty-is that they
require us to seek alternatives before we can justifiably override them.
Other things being equal, a policy that secures voluntary compliance
should have priority over one that relies on the threat of force (however
much force needs to be, and should be available as, a back-up).
Consider, for instance, different strategies to ensure that persons with
tuberculosis (TB) will complete their treatment until cured, in order to
reduce the likelihood of long-term risks to others, particularly from multidrug resistant TB. Other things being equal, the persuasion of, or the
provision of financial or other incentives to, persons with TB to complete
their treatment until cured should have priority over forcibly detaining
them in order to ensure their completion of treatment. In short, proponents
of forcible strategies bear the moral burden of proof. They must have a
good-faith belief, for which they can give supportable reasons, that a
coercive approach is necessary. It is not always necessary to try and fail
various alternatives in order to establish necessity. A reasonable, wellgrounded belief that the alternatives will not work may be sufficient,
especially in a crisis.
3. Least restrictive or intrusive means
Even if forcible quarantine would satisfy the first two conditions,
public health agents should still seek to minimize infringements of liberty.
They should seek the least restrictive and least intrusive alternatives. The
condition of least restrictive or intrusive means could be viewed as a
corollary of necessity-coercive measures should be necessary in degree
as well as in kind-but it is also useful to treat this condition as a specific
requirement.
Similarly, this condition may also be implicit in Gostin's general
limitation on interventions: they must be "well-targeted" interventions."
And he specifically notes that "the framework could adopt the modem
concept of 'shielding'-the governmental duty to engage the community
in voluntary measures of self-protection as a 'less restrictive alternative'
to compulsion."'" Nevertheless, this specific justificatory condition needs
more explicit attention and explication.

40. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health,supra note 1, at 1138.
41. Id. at 1161.
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4. Proportionality
If specific quarantine measures probably would be effective, are
necessary, and are the least restrictive or intrusive measures available, they
then might be considered proportionate. Indeed, some analysts would fold
the two previous justificatory conditions under this broader conception of
proportionality. For instance, a report on ethics and SARS explicates the
ethical value of "proportionality" in just such a way in its examination of
quarantine measures:
When protecting many from harm is ethically necessary, and
when the use of public health powers to achieve those goals
can bejustified, authorities must also protect individuals from
needless coercion. Restrictions of liberty must be relevant,
legitimate and necessary. They must be exercised by people
with legitimate authority, and those people should use the
least restrictive methods that are reasonably available. Such
restrictions should be applied without discrimination.42
By contrast, we treat proportionality as a separate conception, because it
involves balancing broader considerations. Even if we satisfy all the
conditions already identified, we still have to ask whether the probable
benefits (in risk reduction) outweigh the relevant liberty interests, or,
stated differently, whether they are sufficient to rebut the presumption in
favor of liberty (i.e., freedom from governmental coercion). We also have
to determine whether the probable overall (long-term as well as shortterm) effects of the coercive measures would be more positive than
negative.
5. Impartiality
The explication of "proportionality" in the report "Ethics and SARS:
Learning Lessons from the Toronto Experience" includes the requirement
that restrictions of liberty be "applied without discrimination. ' 43 In our
judgment, impartiality also is better understood as a separate and important
justificatory condition. Coercive public health measures, such as
quarantine, should be imposed impartially, thereby satisfying basic
standards of fairness." One meaning of impartiality is that morally

42. UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS, ETHICS AND SARS: LEARNING
LESSONS FROM THE TORONTO EXPERIENCE (Aug.
13, 2003), available at
http://www.utoronto.ca/jcb/SARSworkingpaper.asp.

43. Id.
44. See generallyBRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY (1995).
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irrelevant information about any affected party must not shape the policy
or its application. This condition might seem so obvious that its statement
is unnecessary. However, in many outbreaks of infectious disease in the
past, victims have been blamed along with others in some broad category,
such as race, ethnic background, socio-economic class, or location. As a
result, both individual victims and their associated groups have often been
stigmatized and subjected to various forms of discrimination. In the 2003
SARS outbreak, stigmatization and discrimination occurred in various
settings."
Discrimination, in violation of the requirements of impartiality, may
occur at different levels: the formulation of the policy itself; the
implementation or application of the policy, especially if there is room for
discretionary judgments; and actions by non-governmental agents, such as
individuals in their private capacities. The first two concern the policy and
its execution, while the last may require corrective or remedial public
actions.
Since the burdens of coercive public health measures themselves may
not be-indeed, probably cannot be-distributed equally, it is important
that they be distributed impartially in accord with standards of fairness. In
addition, it is important that the community consider how to make the
burdens more equal, for instance, possibly by compensating individuals for
the extra burdens they have to bear.46 Finally, impartiality, or, more
broadly, fairness, is also important in justifying hard allocation decisions,
such as triage following a bioterrorist attack.47
6. Public justification.
When societies confront tragic choices, where fundamental sociocultural values are at stake, they should attempt to make decisions "in
ways that preserve the moral foundations of social collaboration."4' In a
democratic political order, justification to the public is indispensable.
(Later we will elaborate this point and make a stronger argument about
public participation in setting the policies.) Public justification is needed
both of the law that authorizes coercive public health measures and of
officials' decisions to implement those measures in particular
circumstances. Hence, proponents and agents of forcible quarantine need
to defend it in light of the justificatory conditions we have identified. It is
45. E.g., Justin Schram, Personal Views: How PopularPerceptions ofRisk from SARS Are
FermentingDiscrimination,326 BRIT.MED.J. 939 (2003) (describing discrimination against Asian
persons in Toronto).
46. Etzioni, supra note 4, at 104.
47. See James F. Childress, Triage in Response to a BioterroristAttack, in INTHE WAKE OF
TERROR: MEDICINE AND MORALITY INA TIME OF CRISIS 77 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 2003).
48. GuIDO CALABRESi & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 18 (1978).
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not sufficient to say, "The law permits this action." It also is important to
say, "We are choosing to impose quarantine because ... ." Accountability
to the public requires reasons, explanations, and justifications for practices
of quarantine. All participants in the society are stakeholders who are
entitled to such reasons because they have a stake in the values, like liberty
and privacy, that are displayed, embodied, and, sometimes, overridden.
Hence, transparency is crucial, before, during, and after the crisis, for
at least two reasons. First, transparency respects individuals as members
of a particular political community. Offering reasons and involving them
are ways to recognize their dignity. Second, their cooperation is or will be
needed, and voluntary cooperation presupposes trust. In the Matrix
Reloaded, one of the councilors, played by Cornell West, an AfricanAmerican philosopher at Princeton University, says "comprehension is not
requisite to cooperation." However, in a democratic society, understanding
is vitally important for voluntary cooperation, which should be our goal.
As George Annas writes, "Ultimately, public health must rely not on force
but on persuasion, and not on blind trust but on trust based on
transparency, accountability, democracy, and human rights."49
B. Concerns About Justificatory Conditionsand the
Relevance of Voluntariness
Some communitarians believe that (at least some) efforts to erect tests
or criteria---our presumptions and rebuttal orjustificatory conditions-are
problematic. Reluctant proponents of public health, in Etzioni's words,
"demand that any diminution of rights, as they define them, must pass
numerous tests to show that there is indeed a need to so act" for the public
health.50 Or, as Gostin himself notes, some liberals, who admit that the
harm principle, drawn from John Stuart Mill, can justify coercive
interventions on behalf of public health in some circumstances,
nonetheless insist "that any diminution of individual rights must be so
encumbered with demanding standards and rigorous process that it
effectively thwarts the exercise of power."'"
Despite such concerns and warnings, Etzioni proceeds to develop
criteria from a third perspective, between libertarians and totalitarian
communitarians. This third position holds "that individual rights and social
responsibilities, liberty and the common good, have equal standing; that
neither should be assumed a priorito trump the other; and that we need to
seek a carefully crafted balance between these two core values."52 From

49.
50.
51.
52.

Annas, Human Rights, supra note 10, at 97.
Etzioni, supra note 4, at 102.
Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health,supra note I, at 1144.
Etzioni, supra note 4, at 102 (emphasis added).
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this perspective, Etzioni proposes three criteria for a recalibrated balance
that involves overriding liberty in some contexts: "(1) that a clear and
present danger exist ... ; (2) that voluntary measures be embraced, if
possible; and (3) if not, that the intrusion be minimal . . . ."" While also
noting the need for "clear criteria for decisionmaking,"54 Gostin's article
in this journal does not provide them. However, as Etzioni also notes,
versions of these criteria, particularly his first and third criteria, appear in
Gostin's analyses in other places."
Nevertheless, Etzioni worries that Gostin's framework, in part as
embodied in the MSEHPA, fails adequately to recognize the primacy of
voluntariness in the selection of means:
[Gostin] does not examine the question ofwhether people can
be convinced to voluntarily undertake whatever steps are
needed. In many areas concerning public health, such as
vaccinations, we rely almost completely on voluntary
compliance. With proper public education, most people might
well understand that following an attack with smallpox, a
disease in which symptoms appear before one is contagious,
if they voluntarily would move to a sequestered area for about
two weeks, they might well spare
their loved ones
contamination and possibly death.'
Critics might respond by arguing that attention to voluntariness is not
really feasible in the context of biopreparedness. They might contend that
our j ustificatory conditions of necessity and least restrictive and intrusive
alternative can appropriately function only in situations that involve
relatively small numbers of individuals with more or less clearly defined
and understood contagious diseases. But the kind of planning that is
required now must address scenarios with large numbers of victims, each
potentially a threat to others, of contagious diseases that are difficult to
identify at the outset, that are poorly understood, and that may lack
effective prophylactic and therapeutic responses. In addition, it may be
necessary as in the case of SARS to isolate or quarantine whole buildings,
such as an apartment building in Hong Kong and hospitals and other health
care facilities in several different locations, including Toronto.
Nevertheless, even in the face of such scenarios, voluntariness remains
relevant. Not only does it serve as a presumption in particular situations,
but it also serves as an ideal in formulating public policies. And as an ideal

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 103.
Gostin, When Terrorism ThreatensHealth, supra note 1, at 1161.
Etzioni, supra note 4, at 103.
Id.
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it can guide not only public health legislation but also the development of
other policies that must be implemented to give priority to voluntariness
over coercion. Finally, laws and other policies related to biopreparedness
not only specify obligations (and rights) and their enforcement, they are
also inevitably communicative and symbolic in nature.
C. Imposing Community and Expressing Community
We can develop this point by distinguishing imposing community from
expressing community." In imposing community, a society demands and
enforces individuals' responsibilities to the community. For instance, in
the extreme case, forcible quarantine may be viewed as a governmental
order for public benefit that is imposed on recalcitrant individuals who
respond only to coercive actions or threats. By contrast, in expressing
community, a society extends solidarity to its individual members. In
doing so, it may say to those whose quarantine is important to protect the
public health: "We know what a burden quarantine will be for you and
your family. However, it is important for the public's health, and we will
do all we can to provide what you and your family need." Depending on
whether it is imposing community or expressing community, a society
would act quite differently toward the staff of a hospital that has
experienced an outbreak of a serious communicable disease and now must
be quarantined in order to reduce the risk of further spread.
Even if the goal remains the same-stopping the spread of a contagious
disease such as SARS-different policies symbolize and convey very
different messages. In expressing community, the society's actions
symbolize values like respect, care, and appreciation. For instance, in a
thoughtful examination of lessons learned from Toronto's experience with
SARS, a team from the University of Toronto's Joint Centre for Bioethics
concluded that both solidarity and reciprocity, among other values, were
exceedingly important in securing the needed professional and public
cooperation.58
If a society expresses community through its laws and other public
policies, it may not be forced to impose community. In the U.S., one major
failure of community is the absence of access to health care. Yet in a crisis,
limited access to health care may delay identification of contagious
diseases and hence voluntary cooperation. Even while insisting that "the
state undoubtedly needs a certain amount of authority to protect the
public's health," Gostin also recognizes that "the provision of services

57. For the distinction between imposing and expressing community, see JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRACTICAL REASONING IN BIOETHiCS 117-18 (1997).
58. UNIV. OF TORONTO JOINT CENTRE FOR BIOETHICS, supra note 42.
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may be more important than the exercise of power., 59 Hence, as he
stresses, the MSEHPA recognizes several rights for those subject to
quarantine or isolation: treatment, clothing, food, communication, and
humane conditions.
Because the legislation not only provides legal powers or authorizes
services, but also is symbolic, a fundamental question concerns what the
MSEHPA or any public health law symbolizes and hence communicates
to the public: Does it symbolize an antagonistic relationship between the
government, including public health officials, on the one hand, and
physicians and other health professionals, health care facilities, and the
general public, on the other hand? Does it treat the public and
professionals as individualistic, self-serving, and unconcerned about the
common good and thus in need of a strong dose of coercion? In effect,
does it treat them, in Henrik Ibsen's phrase, as an "enemy of the people?"6 °
To treat citizens-both members of the public and professionals whose
roles are crucial-as potential enemies of public health and security is to
create conditions that could reduce the likelihood of their voluntary
compliance. Even though the law must authorize public officials to address
the worst-case scenarios of non-compliance, its overall symbolic context
is crucially important and may determine how often coercive measures
will be necessary. In short, expressing community may encourage
individuals and professionals to discharge their communal responsibilities
without the necessity of coercion.
VI. JUSTIFICATION IN CONTEXT
Gostin's analysis, in part, attempts "to demonstrate that prevailing
theories of political philosophy support the exercise of liberty-limiting
state power."' However, both his selection and his description of "the
prevailing theories" limit the value of such an exercise. In addition, the
attempt to use any broad political theory may obscure the more important
question implicit in Gostin's article on contemporary public health powers:
"Support from whom to whom?" "Support" suggests an understanding and
a relationship between two parties-in this case between public health
officials and community members. Furthermore, public health is at its core
about relationships-the community members' relationships to each other
biologically, behaviorially, and environmentally, and the individual's
relationship to the community and government. Relationships frame the
meaning of all public health actions.

59. Gostin, Rethinking Individual Rights, supra note 1, at 88.
60. HENRIK IBSEN, An Enemy of the People, in IBSEN: FOUR MAJOR PLAYS 127 (Rick Davis

& Brian Johnston trans., 1995).
61. Gostin, When Terrorism ThreatensHealth, supra note 1, at 1141 (emphasis added).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

A. Relationships in Public Health
Gostin's framework would be enriched by an explicit, detailed analysis
of these relationships,particularly the relationship between government
public health officials and the public. Through its distancing lens, an
abstract theory can distort that core relationship by blurring the important
distinctive qualities which have an impact on the real-world question of
"support" that Gostin implicitly poses. Any examination of the
appropriateness of coercive state action depends on understanding the
actual dialogical process of support (or ofjustification, the framework we
propose above)-the dialogical, reciprocal interaction of person(s) with
person(s). The relationship provides both a starting point for the analysis
and the context within which coercive action and support for (or
justification for) that action takes place. We offer some reflections about
the relationship and its important complementary role as context for our
framework of deliberation involving presumptions and justificatory
conditions.
To begin, the public health relationship is between community
members (who have a background understanding of their roles and the
reciprocal obligations of membership in that community) and government
officials (with their understanding of their authority and role as established
by law, as well as their understanding of their role as health professionals
in society). The relationship is on-going and complex, with a history and
with both intellectual and emotional layers. The relationship between
public health and community also pulls together many perspectives,
languages, and cultures, since it includes government officials, on the one
hand, who often are members of professions with particular expertise and
language, and community members, on the other hand, who have
numerous and simultaneous memberships in diverse groups, families,
cultures, and religions.
In addition, while the relationship between government public health
officials and community members is one manifestation of the complex
relationship between government and individuals generally, it is a
particular type of relationship because health is a primary public good and
many aspects of human potential, like employment, social relationships,
and political participation, are contingent on it. Furthermore, recent events
have demonstrated health's heightened significance for both individuals
and the community as bioterrorist and SARS threats to the individual's
health created new awareness of our collective vulnerabilities and of the
way health connects citizens more fundamentally than most other
collective interests. Within the context of this type of relationship, then,
public health officials act not only as government officers with general
duties, but also as health professionals to the community. People relate not
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only as community members to government officials, but also as patients.
In some ways the process of justification for public health actions, then,
shares some features of an informed-consent process between doctor and
patient; one that is framed as a partnership based on voluntary action, with
a strong presumption against any "unconsented to" action. Particularly in
times of medical need and vulnerability, health professionals usually are
approached as trustworthy because of general societal expectations of and
beliefs about health care professionals.
In contrast, it is important to note that the public health relationship
does not share many overlapping features with the relationship between
military officials and the public. This is significant because Gostin's
analysis at different points seems to conflate the use of public health power
for security reasons and its use for public health purposes. Is there a
difference and if so, does this affect, for example, how physical restraint
is understood? Given that the context of relationships shapes the meanings
and interpretations of actions between parties, one might argue that
restraint by a physician with an offer of medicine may have a very
different meaning than restraint by a military officer with an offer of
medicine or even restraint by a public health officer for military or security
reasons. For instance, the "offer" of medicine may be or feel more
coercive when presented by the military. Similarly, restraint for security
or military reasons by public health officials may make the individual feel
more like an enemy than a patient or partner. This could significantly
damage the public health relationship and lessen trust and goodwill that
may have taken years to develop. We also might explore whether such
actions, especially if performed over time, would have an effect on the
public health official's personal and professional identity.
Relationships also set the context for analyzing whether an act meets
the standards we propose for public justification. A simple case illustrates
how relationships structure the interpretation of the condition of necessity.
Suppose Homeland Security officers have information that suggests a
potential terrorist is hiding in a specific region of the country, and in
addition may need emergency medical treatment for a disease that is
reportable to public health agencies. Homeland Security officers ask the
public health agency for the names of every person of a particular ethnic
background who has been treated within the last fifteen days so that law
enforcement officers can question them, and in addition they ask that in
the future every patient with these characteristics be detained at health
clinics until law enforcement officers can arrive and question them.
Homeland Security forces believe these actions are necessary, because
their frame of reference is national and their mission is to prevent terrorist
events. Local public health officials, however, may believe these actions
are not necessary, and perhaps even disproportionate, because of their
relationship with local-community groups. The requirement to report
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health information and to detain all individuals with certain ethnic
backgrounds would allow public health officials no discretion to exclude
particular patients known to the health officers and would not respect the
long-standing relationships with particular individuals and groups in their
community. Community trust would be destroyed.
The interpretation of what is necessary could vary, depending on the
relationship the government official has with a particular community.
Officials with a "national" perspective, security mission, "command and
control" approach, and little or no relationship with local communities
may analyze what counts as "necessary" differently than the officials who
have on-going relationships with their local communities built on
collaboration, shared decision-making, and trust, and whose focus is the
health of the population they serve.
A further examination of each of the parties involved in the public
health relationship will elucidate why the appropriate use of state public
health authority, by its very nature, depends on the understanding that
community members and government officials bring to that relationship.
What is the government public health official's understanding of his or her
role? The recent Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, The Future of the
PublicHealth in the 21st Century, provides some insight.62 In emphasizing
the multisectoral dimensions of community health, it suggests that a goal
of public health is to collaborate with and facilitate the contributions of
many community entities. Relationships are highlighted in the
report-relationships built on common goals, collaboration, and trust. For
example:
All partners who can contribute to action as a public health
system should be encouraged to assess their roles and
responsibilities, consider changes, and devise ways to better
collaborate with other partners. They can transform the way
they "do business" to better act to achieve a healthy
population on their own and position themselves to be part of
an effective partnership in assuring the health of the
population. Health policy should create incentives to make
these partnerships easier."3
Others have described the contemporary role of public health officials
as translators, mediators, negotiators, educators, or caretakers. Because of
public health's emphasis on prevention, some also have suggested that

62. COMM. ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF THE PUB. INTHE 21ST CENTURY, BD. ON HEALTH
PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIc's HEALTH INTHE

21 ST CENTURY (2003).
63. Id. at 32.
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another metaphor may be fire departments because "[t]hey teach and
practice prevention at the same time that they maintain readiness to take
on emergencies."" Relationship-building, it might be argued, is not just
instrumental, but rather is the substance of the work of public health
professionals. For instance, one proposal in the IOM report is to build "a
new generation of intersectoral partnerships that also draw on the
perspectives and resources of diverse communities and actively engage
them in health action." 65 Building a community of
stakeholders-educating and facilitating individuals and entities to see
themselves as "connected through health"--is central to the identity and
role of public health officials.
B. Civic Identity and Public Deliberation
Who is the public with whom government officials partner and
collaborate? What are the civic ideals Americans express in their
collective governance and in their relationship with government officials?
Americans' philosophical views may be more complex than they appear
in Gostin's analysis of prevailing political theories. Historically,
Americans have had a wide range of attitudes toward their government,
often varying with economic, military, and political issues. They also have
conflicting, often incoherent, civic ideals that fluctuate between egalitarian
and inegalitarian and liberal and nonconsensual orientations, with strong
populist and pragmatic sentiments predominating at different times.
Shared myths both shed light on the American civic identity and operate
to shape that identity. Although they may be "noble lies,"" they can
persuade people with different philosophies, beliefs, and loyalties that they
share a civic identity. For example, in describing the different threads of
"liberalism" and "republicanism" throughout U.S. history, Rogers Smith
shows how part of their appeal is based on mythical components:
The liberalism of the Declaration of Independence includes
the unproved but sanctifying claim that men have individual
rights 'endowed by their Creator.' Both liberal and republican
traditions also often invoke stories of social compacts created
in a state of nature that represent quasi-religious political

64. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., HEALTHY CoMMuNnITEs: NEW PARTNERSHIPS
FOR THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 40 box 12 (Michael A. Stoto et al. eds., 1996).
65. COMM. ON ASSURING THE HEALTH OF THE PUB. INTHE 21 ST CENTURY, BD. ON HEALTH
PROMOTION & DISEASE PREVENTION, INST. OF MED., supra note 62, at 4.
66. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP INU.S. HISTORY

34 (1997).
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creation myths, easily adapted to confer legitimacy on
American constitutions.67
What does this complex civic identity mean for justifying state
coercive actions in public health? Our tradition suggests that appeals for
support or justification must be made to a public that may have
inconsistent ideals and that has a legacy of civic myths that can both
inspire idealism and mask collective wrongs. Thus, public deliberation
becomes critically important so that individuals' civic beliefs can be made
explicit and examined. It also means that building and maintaining
relationships of trust with government officials may be more important
than if we were more united as a public by a coherent political philosophy.
An understanding of the significance of relationships built on trust and the
power of myths and metaphors suggests that formalistic mechanisms, such
as political checks and balances to constrain inappropriate use of power,
are not sufficient for public health officials and for the public trust they
need.
Instead, more active justification by public health officials and
deliberation with the public is necessary to make explicit and acknowledge
the "complex" truths about "we, the people." These truths include the
remarkable collective and voluntary response of Americans to work
together when faced with the terror of 9/11 and also the blaming, isolating,
stigmatizing initial reaction of some community members to others
infected with HIV/AIDS. The evolution of public health policy and
community attitudes toward HIV/AIDS demonstrates the value of public
deliberation in forcing us to expose and to challenge our collective and
individual responses. Bayer describes the political context (deliberation)
that "fostered an unusual series of institutional efforts to engage activists
in the process of establishing guidelines for AIDS policy.""8 He states that
the process was unique not because "those who spoke on behalf of the
vulnerable were engaged at some level, but rather that representatives of
vulnerable populations were sought out as collaborators." '69
In contrast to the case of HIV/AIDS, where societal deliberation was
often facilitated and driven by a politically organized gay community,
public deliberation about biopreparedness and appropriate government
action currently has no interest group to drive it. This means that public
health officials themselves, for many reasons, must take an active role in
generating public debate on these issues. The fire department metaphor for

67. Id. at 36.
68. Ronald Bayer, AIDS, Ethics, andActivism: InstitutionalEncounters in the Epidemic's
FirstDecade, in SOCIETY'S CHOICES: SOCIALAND EmICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 458

(Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. eds., 1995).
69. Id. at 458-59.
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public health provides one reason, by suggesting that drills to prepare for
and challenge our potential responses are appropriate preventive measures.
Drills are important not only as instructive devices for practicing activities
(such as "know the nearest exit"), but also because, in the context of
biopreparedness and state power, we need to "prepare" our civic responses
when challenged as a community. The purpose of public debate is not
merely to have fair procedure or reach consensus on any one course of
action, but rather to build and strengthen our civic commitment to
continued cooperation, essentially to sustain a collaborative relationship
over time. Most importantly, deliberation actively engages the public in
preparation and response as partner and full participant in public health.
It assumes and communicates that individual community members can be
trusted to think and act collectively and voluntarily when threatened.
Although Gostin does acknowledge a role for public deliberation, we
propose practices of interaction between public health officials and
citizens that go well beyond usual democratic procedures.
C. Imaginative Engagement
Gostin also neglects another strand of political thought that provides
insight into the government-individual relationship and notions of civic
life that are particularly relevant for public health. This strand focuses on
civic imagination. In contrast to detached moral principles which ensure
evenhandedness and predictability (but may also weaken emotional
attachment), Martha Nussbaum suggests that civic imagination plays a role
in creating community bonds and in providing motivation and emotional
energy for good citizenship.7"
In their relationship with the community, public health officials have
an opportunity for such "imaginative engagement" to explore deep
collective responses to terror and fear, to vulnerability, and to loss.
Through imaginative engagement, which may include personal narratives,
stories from history or literature, or revelations of personal uncertainties
and vulnerabilities, public health officials and the community together can
imagine various scenarios and the different ways community members
may respond to threats. In this way, they can createcommunity bonds and
can shape collective responses. The stories reported in the national media
of those killed or hurt while selflessly attempting to rescue victims from
the World Trade Center towers are examples of community-building
narratives that shape our social responses and nurture compassion and
trust. As Nussbaum says, "All we can do is trust our imaginations, and
then criticize them (listening if possible to the critical voices of those we
are trying to understand), and then trust them again. Perhaps out of this
70. Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion & Terror, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 10.
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dialectic between criticism and trust something like understanding may
eventually grow."'"
Our reflections suggest that attention to the relationshipbetween the
individual and the government public health official must play a central
role in any analysis of liberty-limiting state power. In our view, a
relationship-centered approach to public health decision-making and
emergency biopreparedness will require that all interventions and
interactions explicitly include the following key elements of the
relationship: collaboration, deliberation, and imaginative engagement.
D. Implicationsfor Risk Analysis and Management
Since risk is a major consideration in Gostin's analytic framework, it
may be useful to briefly illustrate how a "relationship-centered" public
health approach incorporating collaboration, deliberation, and imaginative
engagement could enrich his analysis. Risk-essentially the probability of
an undesired outcome--can be quantitatively assessed by sophisticated
mathematical formulas. However, while "[t]he accepted measure of
likelihood is probability[,] and probabilities obey well-known
mathematical laws," a significant amount of social-science research has
demonstrated that "the human brain tends to manipulate [mathematical
laws] in ways that can ignore this logic, and sometimes contradict it," and
additionally that if these heuristics ("ingrained patterns of thought") are
left unchecked, "they lead to various common biases in dealing with
' Risk perception and the public's reaction to risk are as
probabilities."72
important, if not more important, for public health officials as the
scientific, mathematical calculations are, particularly in biopreparedness
when cooperative community action is essential. Risk perceptions are
sometimes thought to be socially constructed, "a combination of culturally
acquired dispositions."" Langford, Marris, and O'Riordan explain:
"Within that broad phrase [risk perception] lie the norms of scientific
analysis and peer review, expectations and doubts over 'expertise',
bonding and solidarity among people that shape their views on fairness74
and trust, and structures of regulation that build in support or suspicion.
Given this complexity, trust has a crucial role in risk communication.
As Peter Bennet points out, "[p]ut simply, the point is that messages are
oftenjudged first and foremost not by content but by source: who is telling

71. Id. at 26.
72. Peter Bennett, Understanding Responses to Risk: Some Basic Findings, in RISK
COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 11 (Peter Bennett & Kenneth Calman eds., 2001).
73. Ian Langford et al., PublicReactions to Risk: SocialStructures, Images of Science, and
the Role of Trust, in RISK COMMUNICATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 72, at 33.
74. Id.
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me this, andcan I trustthem?"7 These very simple introductory comments
about risk and risk perception demonstrate the different scientific and lay
perspectives. How can we integrate these different perspectives in public
health policy? Laws or analysis, such as Gostin's, which are based on
expert assessments and declarations that risk is significant, may not garner
the necessary community support for collective action. In contrast,
creating channels of communication and building relationships between
public health professionals, experts, and the public to understand risk,
from different perspectives, could engender community trust and
acceptance. In an exploration of the treatment of risk in public policy,
Henry Richardson suggests that sometimes "it is more intelligent to try to
work these matters out via a process of collective, democratic deliberation
'
than to trust to the spurious systematization of risk rationality."76
The risks associated with terrorism increase the need for public
involvement, both because the risks are unique (of a different kind and
intensity) and because they are accompanied by uncertainty, including
about how the public will react. While there is concern about potential
public panic and civil unrest or disobedience in response to a terrorist
event, Thomas Glass and Monica Schoch-Spana point out that "research
on population responses to a wide range of natural and technological
disasters suggests that there is a tendency toward adaptability and
cooperation and that lawless behavior is infrequent."" However, they note
that "in times of disaster, panic may be 'iatrogenic': that is, the actions of
emergency managers may determine the extent and duration of panic, to
the extent it exists. ' 8
What, then, might an appropriate public health response include, using
a relationship-based framework? Certainly at a minimum, it would include
a central role for collaboration and deliberation with many partners and
community members about identifying, assessing, and communicating
risk. Perhaps laws could specify ways that the public should be included
in assessing risk, such as by establishing citizen boards on risk assessment
and communication or specific requirements for public deliberation in
multiple spheres, including the media, the Internet, and government and
private forums. Imaginative engagement with the public about
understanding and responding to terror and risk would also influence
social norms that operate like laws to express social attitudes about
acceptable behavior and what ought to be done. Nussbaum suggests that
the experience of terror and grief could result in a range of reactions from

75. Bennett, supra note 72, at 4.
76. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY 241 (2002).

77. Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism and the People: How to
Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217, 218 (2002).
78. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 5 [2003], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAIWREVIEW

[Vol. 55

blind rage and aggression to compassion and that collectively we can
educate our emotional responses.79 Whatever the state public health action,
however, a primary goal should be building relationships of trust, defined
in an IOM report as "the belief that those with whom one interacts will
take one's interests into account, even in situations in which one is not in
a position to recognize, evaluate, or thwart a potentially negative course
of action by those trusted."8
VII. CONCLUSION

"As Euripides knew, terror has this good thing about it: it makes us sit
up and take notice," writes Martha Nussbaum.8' The critical questions
concern how we take notice. Certainly the events of 9/11 and the anthrax
attacks "provided the occasion for a debate over core values of public
health."82 One early response, within a matter of weeks, was the draft
MSHEPA, prepared by a team under Gostin's leadership. Some critics of
the MSHEPA charged that it put the cart before the horse, by proceeding
with statute drafting, which "is a technical and instrumental job," before
the society had undertaken, much less completed, "the more fundamental
task of deciding what that statute ought to say."83 Furthermore, the drafting
(and even the redrafting in response to criticisms) occurred, some contend,
under the shadow of the events of fall 2001 "when fear ruled reason. ''8 4 In
many ways, Gostin's current article develops a framework, with both
principled analysis and process, that can provide support for the MSHEPA.
Nevertheless, as we have argued, Gostin's framework, while helpful in
several respects, is problematic in others. What is required is an alternative
that moves beyond the liberal-communitarian impasse and beyond
balancing liberty and public health/security. In our judgment, such a
framework must recognize that liberty is part of our communal interests,
along with public health; that trade-offs between liberty and public
health/security can usually be avoided; that, in the selection of means or
measures to protect or promote the goal of public health, there is a
presumption for liberty over coercion; that this presumption for liberty can
be rebutted or overridden when several justificatory conditions are
met--effectiveness, necessity, least restrictive or intrusive means,
proportionality, impartiality, and public justification; that public
79. Nussbaum, supra note 70, at 26.
80. COMM. ON PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., supra note 64.
81. Nussbaum, supra note 70, at 26.
82. Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Public Health vs. Civil Liberties, 297 SCIENCE 1811,
1811 (2002).
83. Kenneth Wing, The Model Act: Is It the Best Way to Preparefor the Next Public Health
Emergency?, Nw. PUB. HEALTH, Spring/Summer 2002, at 10, 10.
84. Annas, Human Rights, supra note 10, at 96.
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justification takes place in the context of relationships that frame the
meaning of public health actions; that the appropriate use of state libertylimiting authority must be interpreted through the lens of the
understanding and the expectations community members and public health
professionals have of each other; and that public justification, deliberation,
and other relationship-building activities may be more important for
biopreparedness than state power because they maintain and nurture civic
ideals, cooperation, and trust.
Perhaps one way we should "take notice" is to extend and deepen the
meaning of the "public" in public health. A stronger public that
deliberates, collaborates, partners, and, most importantly, expects
government officials to provide explicit public justification for their
actions (including legislation, implementation of laws, and actions that fall
within their legal discretion) will be more likely to foster its members'
voluntary participation and trust. For its part, the government can usually
elicit voluntary cooperation from the public by expressing community
rather than imposing it-that is, by extending solidarity to members of the
public, including professionals, from whom much is expected.
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